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Abstract 
Six criteria that methods for assessing the causahty of adver:::e dru~~ 
reactions should satisfy are developed and applied lo evaluate Len currt!nt 
causality assessment methods. The main conclusion is that all lhe methods fail to 
satisfy at least some of the criteria. 
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ASSE.5S ING CAUSALITY ASSESSMENT METiiODS 
1. Introduction 
A drug is administered to a patient, and some time later the patient eiperiences an 
adverse cliruca.1 event. Did the drug cause the event to occur, or would the event have 
happened as and when it did had the drug not been administered? Answering this question 
may be e1ceedingly compleI, and it is nearly always fraught with uncertainty. It is complex, 
because many factors concerning the patient. the suspected drug, other drugs, and non-drug 
e1posures may contribute to the occurrence of the event. It is uncertain, because the 
information concerning these factors (or even the event itself) is rarely complete and 
accessible ( l 0, 17]. Consequently, various methods have been developed during the past ten 
years to assess the causal links between drugs and adverse events (3. 4, 6, 7. l 0, 11, 14, 18, 
19, 20, 25, 27, 31). 
Although these causality assessment methods differ from one another in many respects, 
they share a common basic structure. First. they pose a series of questions that elicit 
pertinent details about a particular case involving a suspected adverse drug reaction. These 
questions are designed to determine whether the timing and clinical characteristics of the 
adverse event are consistent with its being an adverse reaction to the drug; whether 
alternative etiological candidates eiist; whether the event, if reversible, abates when the drug 
is discontinued (dechallenge) and reappears if the drug is readministered to the patient 
(rechalJenge): in addition, most of the methods ask whether the event is generally recognized 
as a possible adverse reaction to the drug. Second, the methods give procedures for 
converting the answers to these questions into a measure or tbe probability that the adverse 
event under consideration was caused by any ci the dru,zs to which the patient had been 
exposed. 
It is important to clarify what is meant by the probability that a drug D caused an adverse 
event E, especially since there is some confusion on trus point in the causality assessment 
literature. Most authors have regarded the probability of drug causation as an objective 
attribute of the particular drug-event connection, that can be determined from publicly 
accessible and unambiguous evidence that is elicited in response to "operational" questions. 
According to this view. there is one correct answer to the question of drug causation. and 
logical processing or the available information will yield that answer (see, for e1ampJe, 
113,1.f,18)). 
We do not believe that this point of view holds up under careful analysis. Rather, ve 
maintain that the probability of drug causation is a subjective measure of the assessor·s 
uncertainty, based on incomplete and perhaps conflicting information. In other words, the 
available evidence does not permit a "correct" answer. In reality, D either~ or did not 
cause E, in the sense that E either would or would not have occurred as and when it did, had 
D not been administered. The difficulty is that one cannot. on the strength of the information 
available, deter mine with certainty which of these alternatives is oorrect. 
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If nothing depended on it. the e1tent of the uncertainty about whether D caused E would 
be a matter of no concern. But in many situations one would act dW:erently if he knew that D 
caused Ethan if he knew that it did not: for e1ample. a clinician might immediately cease 
therapy with D if he knew it caused E. while if he were certain that it djd not. he would 
continue ad ministering D and prescribe treatment for E; or, the e1perimenters might 
discontinue a clinical trial on a new drug D if they knew for sure that it had caused a 
subject's death, while they would continue the trial if the death were unrelated to D. In such 
cases. what one decides to do depends in part on how likely be believes it is that D caused E. 
and so it is important to measure the e1tent or degree or this belief as a step in the process or 
deciding which action to take. The degree or this belier is what we mean by 11the probability 
Lhat D caused E"'.1 
Thus, a causality assessment method is a procedure for eliciting a ''state of information" 
about a particular drug-event connection as input and delivering as output a "degree of 
belief' about the truth of the proposition that the drug caused the event to occur. In 
particular, the probability that D caused Eis not an objective attribute of the facts of the case 
alone, but depends on the "state of information" of the person or persons carrying out the 
causality assessment. 
Whlch, if any, causality assessment method should one use? The purpose of this paper is 
to address this question by developing aiteria that causality assessment methods should 
satisfy and applying these criteria to evaluate currently available assessment methods. The 
main conclusion is that all current methods fail to satisfy at Jeast some of these criteria. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provjdes a critical review of the two criteria 
for causality assessment methods that can be found in previous papers on the subject. In 
section 3, we introduce and justify six criteria for causality assessment methods, and in 
section 4 we use these criteria to evaluate ten current methods. 
2. Reproducibility and Validity; A Critical Review 
The current literature on causality assessment focuses on two criteria for causality 
assessment methods: reproducibility and validity. Broadly speaking, a method is 
reproducible if it yields the Bm.t answer when applied more than once to the same case, and 
a method is valid if it yields the ti&h1 answer. Stated thus, both aiteria seem eminently 
reasonable, but we will argue that neither apply without substantiaJ refinement to the 
causality assessment problem. 
Reproducibility 
Two different forms of the reproducibility aiterion have been invoked in the causality 
assessment literature. Interobserver reproducibility requires different evaluators using the 
same causality assessment method on the same case to arrive at the same conclusion, while 
intraobserver reproducibility requires that a single evaluator be self-consistent when he uses 
I An e1cellent discussion of probability as measure of degree of belief, and the use of 
probability in decision-making. can be found in (23). 
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the same method on tbe same case more than once. Only one paper (25) has eiamined the 
intraobserver reproducibility or a causality assessment method. In contrast. many papers 
have studied interobserver reproducibility for a variety of methods, starting with the 
important work of [arch et al. (15) and [och-Weser, Sellers and Zacest (16), both of which 
showed the extent to which the unaided judgement or eiperts fails to attain interobserver 
reproducibility. Most standardized causality assessment methods do much better with 
respect lo this criterion. and this r act has been the mahl argument advanced by their 
adherents in r avor or the widespread adoption or these methods (3, 9. 22, 25).2 
Evaluators with the same "state of information" about the connection between a drug D 
and an adverse event E should have the same "degree of belief' that D caused E. But 
different evaluators. even with the same access to such 11objective"' sources or information as 
individual case records and standard reference works. do not necessarily share the same 
"st.ate of information .. about the connection between D and E. For example. a case record 
might document that the onset or E occurred two days after administration of D. but the 
causal implications of thls r act depend on a complicated web of theory and fact, including 
possible mechanisms by which D might cause E, the likelihood that an event of type E might 
occur from some other cause than D. and the timing distribution for onset cl B for each 
possible D-causative mechanism and alternative causal agent. These tbeorjes and facts are all 
clouded by uncert.ainty, and each evaluator views them through the light ot his own opinions 
and e1perience, whose relevance cannot be disregarded just because they are not "objective" 
and explicit. 
Because of the compJe1ity of the web of belief and experience that forms "states of 
information''. we are inclined to doubt that different evaluators ought to share them. As a 
result, we believe that interobserver reproducibility is not a reasonable ~iterion for a 
causality assessment method. Rather, we think that it is of great importance that a method 
eipHcitJy identify the key elements in an evaluator's "state of information", thus providing a 
possible mechanism for resolving differences between individual evaluators. and that it give 
each element its due weight in the causality assessment process. Specific criteria for 
achieving these goals are discussed in the next sectjon of this paper. 
To achjeve interobserver reproducibility, the authors of most causality assessment 
methods tend to sweep uncertainty under the rug. They elicit only those aspects of the 
evaluator's "state of information" that are most public and objective, not necessarily the most 
important for distinguishing drug from nondrug causation. To avoid disagreements among 
evaJuators, questions are posed with false precision: for example. the evaluator is typically 
asked to decide whether the timing or the event Eis "consistent" with D-causation. avoiding 
the important issue of just JiQE oonsistent the timing is, compared to alternative causative 
agents. Similarly, current methods elicit crude qualitative categorizations rather than 
quantitative estimates of the magnitude of effects: for eiampJe. in determining whether 
events of type B are known to occur as adverse reactions to D. most methods do not 
distingujsh between incidence rates as disparate as I in 100 and I in 1000000. The tendency 
to ask questions that muimize the chance of agreement between evaluators Jeads to the 
2 A contrasting view is presented in (241. 
elimination from consideration or those Mentirely une1pected but vital imponderables which 
play a role in determining the value or a particular piece oC evidence" (51. thus prejudicing 
M.N.G. Dukes against the use of any algorithmic causality assessment method. We share 
Dukes' concern. but we consider this tendency an argument not against standardized 
assessment methods. but against the criterion of interobserver reproducibility. 
Validity 
For certain kinds of probability assessment problems, it is possible to validate assessed 
probabilities by converting them into predictions about future observables. Suppose one 
wanted to evaluate a method for generating prognostic probability assessments -- for 
e1ample, the method might produce an assessment that the probability for five-year survival 
given certain prognostic features is 1 /2. Now if a cohort of patients with these features is 
assembled and if the probability assessment is correct, then in five years about 1 /2 of them 
should have died. In this way, a collection of probability statements about future 
observables can be checked against eiperience to validate the method that produced the 
probabilities. 
Unfortunately. probability assessments for events that have already occurred cannot be 
validated in this way. The aim of these assessments is not to predict what will happen but to 
gauge the prob ability of what did happen. Of course, if there were a pathognomonic test that 
could be applied retrospectively, the validity of a causality assessment method could be 
tested by seeing jf a high proportion of those events judged "definite., turned out to be true 
adverse reactions, a smaller proportion of the .. probables" and so forth, down to a negligible 
proportion of the "unrelateds". The problem is, of course, that such tests rarely eiist. Even 
when they do, the result should be incorporated into the asse~sment method itself, rather 
than used as a test of validity in the tesrs absence. 
Consequently, workers in the causality assessment field have turned to an alternative 
validation procedure, whose premise is: .,to establish validity comparison with a standard is 
necessary" (251. Such a procedure makes sense only if a reliable standard exists. The 
standard adopted in the causality assessment literature is the unaided judgement of eiperts, 
supplemented by some consensus-producing convention when the e1perts disagree with one 
another (7, 9, 14, 22, 25, 31. 30).3 Now, to qualify as a "standard''. a causality assessment 
must satisfy two requirements. First, the "state of information" on which it is based should 
be as complete and accurate as possible. Second, the technique used to convert this "state of 
information" into a "degree of belier' that the drug caused the event should merge the 
different elements in that .. state of information.. in a reasonable and unbiased way. 
The unaided judgement of experts may achieve tbe first of these goaJs, but certainly rails 
to achieve the serond. Cognitive psychologists have shown that the ability of the human 
brain to make unaided assessments of uncertainty in complicated situations is poor. We tend 
to scan the list of relevant facts, focus on one or two that seem particularly striking, and 
disregard the rest; and the situation is even worse when we try to argue from effect to cause. 
3 For more sophisticated attempts to achieve concordance with eipert judgement, see [ 1) and 
(26]. 
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as in the causality assessment problem.4 Nor is the argument against the experts· unaided 
judgement as a standard for causality assessment merely theoretical: the adverse drug 
reaction Uterature provides ample evidence ror its unreliability. documenting as it does the 
wide variability in assessments produced by different experts analyzing the same cases (see, 
for example 3, 9, 15, 16, 22, 25). 
We believe that the effort to validate causality assessment methods by comparing their 
performance on particular cases to some .. standard .. method applied to those cases cannot 
succeed, because no true goJd standard method eiists. How then can we test the validity of 
these methods? Our answer is that aiteria for validity must be applied not to the output of 
the methods. but to their procedures for merging and balancing the different elements in the 
"states of information" that serve as the method's input. That is, what must be validated is 
the JQii£ of the methods, not their oonclusions. In the neit section, we shall turn to the task 
of developing aiteria for the logic of causality assessment. 
3. SiJ Criteria for Causality Assessment Methods 
In this section, we present and justify siI criteria for causality assessment methods. The 
first three criteria are int.ended to refine the reproducibility criterion discussed above. while 
the last three are designed to ensure that the methods process information in a logically valid 
way. The fourth criterion concerns the questjon of what information should be incorporable 
into the .. state or information .. elicited by a method, while the fifth and siith have to do with 
how the evidence in the .. state of information" should be evaluated and combined. 
Criterion 1: Repeatability. 
When the same "state of information" is used more than once as input, a causality 
assessment method should produce tbe same .. degree of belief' as output. 
Discussion: That a causality assessment method should satisfy this aiterion is self· 
evident, but it is difficult to show that one does so. since it must first be established that two 
evaluators share a "state of information... Here are two procedures for checking that a 
method is repeatable, but neither is fully satisfactory, since the first is artificial and the 
second requires an unverifiable assumption. First. construct a set of artificial, fully eiplicit 
"states of information .. , each specifying the case and background information for a particular 
adverse clinical event: then have different subjects apply the causality assessment method, 
ta.king care that each use the given ··state or information" as the sole input. and compare the 
corresponding outputs. Seoond, assume that the same individual is in the same "state of 
information" about the same case at tvo different time periods; this assumption may be 
approiimately correct if the indjviduaJ does not gain any relevant new knowledge or 
41 For a stimulating discussion of the psychology of reasoning in the face of uncertainty, see 
( 12); for a more detailed discussion of the difficulties of unaided causality assessments, see 
(21 ). . 
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e1perleoce between the two limes. With this assumption and in this situation, repeatability 
reduces to intraobserver reproducibility, which can be checked as in (25). 
Criterion 2: E1 olicitness. 
A causality assessment method should require that its user make explicit his "'state ot 
information", including the uncertainty he feels about each of its elements. 
Discussion: This aiterion imposes two requirements on a causality assessment method. 
The first concerns the content: the "state of information" must be elicited in as eiplicit form 
as possible. "States of information" are complicated: they include not only the objective facts 
of the case under oonsideration(such as the clinical rondition and prior medical history of the 
patient, the symptoms and timing of the adverse event itself, and the nature and timing or 
the responses to decballenge and rechallenge), but all the background knowledge and opinion 
that provide causal links between these facts and the various possible etiologies for the 
event. It is simply impossible to reason about comple1 and uncertain material in a coherent 
way, since it cannot all be held in mind simultaneously. Moreover, it is easier for dilTerent 
evaJuators to pool their knowledge and assumptions and arrive G. :nutually agreeable 
assessments if they have each first laid out what they know and oelieve as eiplicitly as 
possible. 
The second requirement of the eiplicitness criterion pertains to uncertainty. Evaluators 
should have to make explicit the degree of their uncertainty about each of the elements in 
their "states of information". This is necessary because many of the important elements 
simply cannot be known with certainty, and the effect that such elements have on the 
assessment should depend on the strength of the evaluators· belief in their truth. 
How can one determine whether a causality assessment method satisfies the explicitness 
criterion? Clearly, the criterion is not an absolute standard: it is a..tways a question of the 
degree to which it is satisfied. NonetheJess. it is possible to identify certain "..-ays in which 
methods can fail to satisfy one or both requirements of this criterion. 
A method may violate the first requirement by failing to deal explicitly with the contents 
of an evaluator's "state of information". It may do this by posing questions in such a way that 
specific elements of the "state of information .. are left implicit or even entirely omitted. For 
eiample, the method may not require the user to specify alternative etiologies to the suspect 
drug (other drugs. drug interactions, the disease for which the suspect drug is administered, 
known comorbidity, or "unknown" etiology) or the type of reaction B might be to D 
(immunologic, dose-dependent, cytotoxic, and so forth). Bven if these elements are elicited, 
however, the method may not make e1plicit the way in which they relate to one another and 
to the overall causality assessment. That is. the method may pose questions that call for the 
user to make implicit integrative judgements, rather than to take e1plicit acx:ount of the belief 
networks that connect the facts with their causal implications (for example, the user may be 
asked merely whether the timing of an event is .. consistent"' with drug causation, vith no 
further clarification d the reasoning leading to such a gJobal judgement). 
A method may also fail to satisfy the requirement pertaining to the elicitation of the user's 
uncertainty. One way in which it may damp out uncertainty is to admit onJy "yes - no .. 
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answers (or at most. to allow the user to respond "don ·1 know". without making e1plicit the 
enent d his uncertainty). 
Criterion 3: Elplanatory Capability. 
A causality assessment method must ""eiplain .. how it reaches its conclusions; that is, it 
must make it clear to the user why it produced the output "degree of belier· from the 
inf or matjon it elicited. 
Discussion: Causality assessment methods must make e1pllcit the effect that each 
component of the elicited "state of information"" has on the final assessment, and their users 
must be able to understand the rationale behind the transformation from information to 
degree of belief. Only if this process appears reasonable and not arbitrary can users gain 
confidence jn the method. a confidence that is impossible if the method always functions as a 
.. black bo1". Another advantage to eiplanatory capability is that it allows the user to identify 
what information turned out to be the most important in determining the overall causality 
assessment, and so he can focus his attention on the relatively few elements that drive the 
assessment, refining his opinions {and getting additional information) where it will make the 
most difference. 
Criterion :i: Completeness. 
A causality assessment method must respect R. A. Fisher's fundamental rule of uncertain 
inference: never throw information away.5 That is, any fact. theory or opinion that can affect 
an evaJuator·s belief that a drug D caused an adverse event B must be incorporable by the 
method into the "'state of information"" on which the assessment is based. 
This criterion has three particularly important corollaries: 
Corollary 1: Confronting uncertainty. Uncertain information cannot be ignored, nor 
can it be acted upon as though it were known with certainty. 
More specifically, suppose that a particular piece of information would affect the 
evaluator's degree of belief that D caused E, if the evaluator were certain that the 
information were true. Then a causality assessment method must take this 
information into account even if the evaluator is not certain about its truth. and the 
impact of this information on the causality assessment must depend on the eitent to 
which the evaluator believes that the information is true. 
~ Fisher's expression of the ruJe is more elegant: .. the logical characteristic. which has been 
too much overlooked. of alt inferences involving uncertainty is that the rigorous specification 
of the nature and e1tent of the uncertainty by which they are qualified must in general 
involve the l.'hole of the data, quantitative and qualitative, on which they are based." {(8), p. 
113). 
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Corollary 2: Handling auantitative information auantatively. A causality 
assessment method must not require its users to interpret quantitative data 
qualitatively before accepting lhem as input, but must be able to elicit and process 
magnitudes directly. 
Corollary 3: Using background information. When applied to a particular case of an 
adverse event E suspected d being a reaction to a drug D. a causality assessment 
method must take into account not only the details of that particular case. but all the 
background information relevant to the general connection between D and events of 
type B. This includes theories from the basic sciences, data from laboratory 
e1periments and clinical experience. as well as epidemiological data about the relative 
incidence of events of type E when Dis and is not ad ministered to patients similar with 
respect to risk for events of type E to the particular patient under consideration. 
Discussion: The completeness aiterion prohibits a causality assessment method from 
eicluding a priori any kind of information that an evaluator might find relevant to a 
particular assessment problem. The criterion can be applied to require that a method deal 
with information of a particular form, as in c:orollaries 1 and 2. or with information with 
particular cxmtent. as in Corollary 3. To test whether the aiterion is satisfied is not really 
possible. since to do so would require one to know in advance all possible sources and forms 
of information that might conceivably be relevant to some particular evaluator in some 
particular case. Nonetheless. it is possible to detect instances in which methods fail to satisfy 
the criterion, and this can be done, as the corollaries suggest. in some generality, without 
ref erring to the details of particular cases. 
Corollary 2 may require special comment. As an eiample, suppose an epidemjologicaJ 
study carried out with subjects similar to the patient in the case under review reported an 
incidence rate of 1 event of type E per 1,000 e1posures to drug D. compared with a rate of 1 
event per 2,000 patients who did not receive D. The inferential content of this data may be 
difficult to assess. but it is surely different than it would be if the numbers were l per 1.000 
compared to 1 per l 0,000. say; or 1 per l 0,000 compared to 1 per 100,000; moreover. it 
would hardly be sensible to select some arbitrary cutpoint and attempt to argue that if the 
ratio (or perhaps the difference 7) of the two incidences e1ceeded the cut point then the 
meaning of the information was qualitatively different than if it did not. According to 
CoroUary 2. a causality assessment method is deficient if it leaves to the user the task of 
extracting a qualitative summary of such numbers, instead of providing a method of deriving 
an appropriate contribution to the '"degree of belief' directly from the numerical data itself. 
Criterion 5 BtiologicaJ b alanci,ng. 
It is not sufficient to evaluate case data just in terms of their concordance or discordance 
with the hypothesis that the drug D caused the event E. Rather, it is necessary to balance the 
likelihood of the data assuming that D caused E against the likelihood assuming alternative 
causes. 
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Discussion: According to 1.h.is aiterion. a causality assessment met.bod can evaluate data 
concerning tbe clinical details d a parUcular case only by oom oaring the answers to two 
questions: how likely would this particular clinical picture be. if the event E really were an 
adverse reaction to the drug D. and how likely would it be, if the event E were unrelated to 
D? ~n alternative strategy for causality assessment, which we call the 1)-causal hypothesis 
strategy .. , rocuses only on the first or these questions. With this strategy. each piece d 
evidence is ranked as to how consistent it is with the "D-causal hypothesis" that D caused E 
(for e1ample: if an adverse reaction to D of type E usually occurs between one and three days 
after initial e1posure to D. and if in this case E happened two days after eiposure. then this 
information about time or onset is highly consistent with tbe '1>-causal hypothesis .. ). The case 
data is essentially divided into two piles: the data that are concordant with this hypothesis, 
and the data that are discordant with it. A method using the "D-causal hypothesis .. strategy 
then delivers its .. degree of belief' assessment as a function or how much higher the first pile 
is than the second (perhaps taking into account some cumulative measure of bow concordant 
or discordant the ele ment.s in the piles are). 
Methods using the "D-causal hypothesis .. strategy need not ignore the problem of 
alternative etiologies. Typically. they consider tbe existence or obvious alternative etiologies 
ror E (tor eiample: other drugs, the con,,· ·uon ror which tbe patient is being treated. or known 
co morbidity) as a particular piece of evidence that is discordant with tbe D-causal hypothesis. 
What they do not do is to consider how likely all the rest of the clinical evidence is, assuming 
that each of these alternatives were the true etjoJogy for E. Nor do they deal with the more 
difficult questions of how likely it is that E has some other. unknown etiology, and how likely 
the clinical evidence is. assuming that some unknown cause is operating. These questjons 
must be addressed if a method is to satisfy the etiological balancing criterion. 
Why should the strategy of etiological balancing be preferred to the ·t>-causal hypothesis .. 
strategy? The basic justification rests on the following premises: causality assessment is 
really a process of differential diagnosis; the evidentiary significance of each item of case 
informatjon lies in jts ability to distinguish between the 'D-causal hypothesis" and alternative 
etiologjcal hypotheses; and the way to measure the e1tent to which the information does 
distinguish between these hypotheses is to compare bow much more (or less) likely the data 
are. given the hypothesis of D-causation than given the alternative hypothesis. 
The "D-causal hypothesis" strategy and the strategy of etiological balancing are not 
equivalent: in many cases. they can yield different answers. Consider the following eiample. 
A patjent is simultaneously started on dialysis and infusion wjth inferon. Within ten minutes, 
he experiences hypotension and shortness of breath. Is this adverse event a reactjon to the 
dialysis or is it anaphyla1is induced by the inf eron? From the point of view of the .. D-causar 
hypothesis. the ti ming of the event is highly concordant with inf eron-causation. so this 
information should increase the "'degree of beHef' that the event is an anaphylactk reactjon 
to inf eron. On the other hand, the timing is just as consistent with dialysis-causation for the 
event. and so from the point d view of the strategy of etiological balancing, the information 
can neither increase nor decrease the ''degree of belier· in D-causaUon. 
Even more enreme e1amples can arise, especially when more than one drug could cause a 
particular event. In such cases. it is possible that data that is consistent with the hypothesis 
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that one or the drugs caused the event E may actually deaease the ··degree of belief' that lhi: 
drug caused E. because such data has even greater likelihood if another candidate drug is the 
cause. 
C:Citerion 6: No a priori constraints on the effects or factors. 
A causality assessment method should not limit a priori the effect that information about 
any particular factor (tor eiample: background incidence. timing, response to dechallenge 
and rechallenge, patient"s history) can have on the output "degree of belier'. 
Discussion: The following two eiampJes illustrate the rationale behind this criterion. since 
they show that under certain oonditions a positive response to decha.Uenge can determine the 
outcome of a causality assessment. while in other conditions the same kind of information can 
have virtually no effect on the assessment. Other e1amples, referring to timing, clinical 
characteristics of the event B, response to dechallenge and rechallenge. and background 
incidence are presented in appendil 1 at the end of this paper. As these examples show, 
methods can err in two directions: they can limit the magnitude cl the effect of particular 
r actors, or they can require that certain kinds or information (for eiample: posjtive response 
to dechalJenge or rechallenge) always have an effect of greater magnitude than they may 
warrant in particular circumstances. 
Example 1: A patient on hydralazine develops systemic manifestatjons of systemic Jupus 
erythematosus, along with a positive anti-nuclear factor in the blood. All manifestations, 
including the anti-nuclear factot\ clear without other treatment sil months after 
discontinuing the hydralazine. Since systemic lupus caused by something other than the 
hydraJazine wouJd be very unlikely to clear spontaneously in this time period, the positive 
response to dechaUenge in this case is very strong evidence of hydralazine causation. This 
e1ampJe shows that the confirmatory effect of a positive response to dechallenge should not 
be limited a priori. while the next e1ampJe shows that it is aJso might be necessary to 
discount the evidentia.ry significance of a positive response to dechallenge under duf erent 
circumstances. 
Example 2: A patient is hospitalized for cough, chills, fever and shortness of breath. While 
in the hospital. she is discovered to be hypertensive and methyJdopa therapy is initiated. 
Within twenty four hours, she notes an increase in malaise and cough. Her serum amylase is 
then found to be elevated (760 units/dL, inaeasing to 1050 units/dL 12 hours later). 
MethyJdopa is then discontinued (24 hours after detection of hyperamylasemia). and within 
48 hours, serum amylase has fallen to 210 units/dL. This appears to be a positive response 
to dechallenge with methyJdopa, but in fact the elevated amylase would be expected to drop 
within 24 hours regardless of etiology, and so the response to dechallenge is neutral with 
respect to the hypothesis of methyJdopa causation. 
4. Evaluation of Current Methodologies 
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In this section. we apply the criteria discussed in the previous section to evaluate ten 
standardized causality assessment methods. The methods evaluated are those or [arch and 
Lasagna ( 1 ~] (denoted by KL); Dangomau. Evreui and jouglard (4). in the version reported in 
(21 (denoted by DEJ); Kramer et al. (I 8] (denoted by K.LHF); Blanc et al. [31 (B}; Venulet. Ciucci 
and Berneker (31 l. with the scoring system reported in (29) (denoted by CG. for Ciba-Geigy); 
Emanueti and Saccbeti 17) (ES); Naranjo et al. (25) (N); Jones [11]. as reported in (28) (denoted 
by FDA); Lagier, Vincens and Castot ( 19) (LVC); and Stephens 127) (S). 
For the purposes of this evaluation, we have divided the ten methods into three groups, as 
indicated in Table 1 below. The methods in the first group are quite short posing r ewer than 
ten questions to elicit states of information. The Group 2 methods are more complicated and 
elicit more complete states of information than those in lhe first group. L VC is the sole 
member of the third group. It is distinguished from the others in several respects, most 
strikingly by its use or etiological balancing. 
TABLE 1 OOES HERE 
We now turn to a detailed discussion or the performance of the methods with respect to 
each of the criteria (except criterion t. repeatability. which we have not eiamined). The main 
conclusion of our evaluation is that none of these methods satisfy all the criteria; indeed. most 
of the methods violate most of the criteria. 
Criterion 2: Explicitness 
Recall that this criterion imposes two requirements; the first is that a method must elicit 
an eiplicit statement of its u~r's state of information. But states of information are too 
complicated to be elicited in response to ten ·yes-no .. questions, so Group 1 methods have to 
compromise with respect to this criterion. This compromise has two aspects: first, the 
elements of the state of information that provide the conteit for evaluating the evidentiary 
significance of the facts of the case are left implicit (for example: none ask the user to list all 
the alternative etiological candidates, or to consider the mechanism whereby D causes E, if E 
is an adverse reaction to D. and so forth}; and second, the questions posed by the methods call 
for broad implicit integrative judgements from the user. Examples of such questions include 
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the foUowing, from KL6: was there an .. appropriate interval between agent-event7"; can the 
.. event (be) reasonably eipJained by clinical state or other (nondrug) therapjesr: were the 
manifestations of the event .. improved with dechallenge7". aearJy, the answers to such 
questions depend a-ucially on the subjective and implicit interpretation given to terms lite 
"appropriate''. .. reasonably .. and .. improved". Some methods in this group avoid such 
integrative questions. but then only at the price of negJecting to obtain relevant information: 
for e1ample, the only question posed by N about the timing of Bis Ndid the adverse event 
appear after the suspected drug was administered?''. which does not call for the user to 
decide about the "appropriateness .. of the onset time with respect to D-causation, but neither 
does it allow any information about the length of time between administration of D and onset 
of E to affect the causality assessment. 
In part because the user's uncertainty is already integrated into his answers to the 
questions they pose, Group 1 methods simply ignore the second requirement of the 
eiplicitness requirement, that tbe user make eiplicit the enent of rus uncertainty about the 
information elicited from him. Only N even allows the user to respond "don't know''. and N 
makes no further effort to elicit what the user believes. and to what extent, about the 
questions whose answers he "doesn't know" with certainty. 
The methods in Group 2 elicit states of information much more e1plicitJy than do those in 
Group I. They require the user to provide many details about the case itself and the 
interpretative framework in which the case will be analyzed (alternative etiologjes, 
mechanisms. etc. -- see, for example, the rune-fold classification of "category of adr" in CG or 
question 20 of the same method that asks the user whether Eis a bioJogically plausible 
adverse reaction to D). In general, the Group 2 methods do well in eliciting the kind of 
detailed case information that can be operationally defined (see, for e1ample, nHF's 
dechalJenge axis ). On the other hand. they are not as successful in determining those 
elements of the state or information that depend on the user·s uncertain beliefs and opinions. 
Unlike the methods in Group 1, Group 2 methods allow and even encourage7 "don't .know" 
answers. but they do not probe the user's degree of belief when he is not certain. Thus, an 
extra JeveJ of implicit judgement is involved in deciding whether to mark "U .. for "unknown" 
(that is, not known with certainty) or to give a "certain" answer. to questions like the 
6 ll is not "worst case .. by any means. Other eiampJes include the following: "are there 
good alternative non-drug-related e1pJanatjons for the event?" (DEJ: what does ''good" mean 
in thls context 7). B asks the user to choose between the f olJowing three state men ts: .. M 1: The 
manifestations observed could not be due to the underlying disease. M2: They might be due 
to the disease, but the evolution was in favor of adverse reaction. M3: They could be due to 
the underlying disease and, moreover, the evolution was against the possibility of an adverse 
reaction:· FDA asks ··does event have a reasonable temporaJ association with use of the 
drug 7" and .. could the event be due to an eiisting clinical condition?''. and only allows yes-no 
answers (no "don't know" or .. ambiguous"). 
7 "We insi!t that (the assessment] reflects information, not usumptions. That means that if 
certain information is not given, it should not be assumed .. 00°, but it should be marked as 
unknown." {(29), p. 317), discussing the use of ffi). 
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following (from CG): ""Drug/ ADR interval compatible with the event? {Possible answers: 
typical; compatible: incompatible; or Ut: "ADR occurrence facilitated by the disease treated 
or by concomitant diseases? (Possible answers: yes; no; or U)"'; "Other rontributory factors 
(habits. environment etc.)? (Possible answers: yes; no; or U)".s How can a user's information 
relative 1.o such questions be elicited properly if his uncertainty about the data and hls 
interpretative framework is not e1plicitly assessed? 
L VC works completely diff erenUy from the other methods. For each of nine factors, the 
user is presented wilh a list of general considerations and lben asked to measure his 
uncertainty about D-causation, with respect to the evidence relevant to the factor in question, 
on an uncalibrated scale of O to 1. These scores are then merged into three more general 
scores on the same scale (chronological. symptomological and relative risk), and then these 
are merged once more int.o an overall judgement of 11imput.ation". that also takes into account 
the user's assessment of the compJeteness and reliability or the evidence. Each of these 
successive scorings is integrative and implicit. Thus, Utis method fails lo elicit the state of 
information eiplicitly; in fact it makes no effort to do so at all. On the other hand, its purpose 
is precisely to obtain an explicit measurement of the user's uncertainty about the 
information available to him and its implications for D-causation. 
Criterion 3: EJptanatory Capability 
All the methods except L VC determine the output degree of belief as explicit functions of 
the ann,l'ers provided to the questions they pose. Thus, it is possible for users of these 
methods to trace the effect of any particular answer on the overall assessment. On the other 
hand, the more questions there are or the more complicated the scoring functions, the more 
difficult it is to sort out the effects of general assumptions or opinions (for e1ample, about the 
mechanism of the adverse reaction or about the possibJe role of the clinical condjtion in 
facilitating or causing El. since these typically effect tile answers to more than one question. 
Group 2 methods are particularly confusing in this regard: k:LHF because the number of 
questions it poses is large. and CG and S because their scoring functions are especially 
complicated, the points attached to each question varying with the question and with the 
category of adverse reaction (nine in CG, two in S) selected by the user. 
Ho·,lever, explanatory capability requires more than making clear to the user how an 
assessment was reached: the method must make clear why it was reached as well. No 
method achieves this goal In all of them the scoring attached to each question appears 
arbitrary and is not eiplicitJy justfied, and the same is true for the procedure by which these 
scores are combined into an overall assessment (see the discussion of aiterion 6 below for 
details on one particular aspect of this arbitrariness). For eiample. UHF in effect evaluates 
the ab9ence of dechallenge as evidence in favor of D-causation by awarding a point on the 
dechallenge uis if no dechaUenge occurs and the sum of the scores on the first two ues 
a CG is equipped with a five pa8e "List of Definitions and Clarifications"' to help the user 
answer its questions, but there is no comment about the degree of certainty the user must 
feel before he should give an answer to these (and !imilar) questions different from U. 
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eiceeds two; similarly, DEJ gives a score or three to an irreversible event with .. oonslstent 
timing"'. while scoring only two for a reversible event with equally "consistent timing·· tor 
which the response to dechallenge is .. not assessable ... either because dechallenge vas not 
attempted or because the symptoms of the event were treated directly. Even when the 
scoring is not as obviously arbitrary as in these e:umples, the reasoning behind it is neither 
e1plained nor apparent. 
L VC is again an e1ceptional case. Its authors take the point of view that the assessment 
process cannot be reduced to a calculation that provides its own justification: ··imputation is 
neither a sum nor a product of scores; rather, it js an assessment that cannot be given by a 
"·ell-defined mathematical function .. ( 19. p. 311). As such. they make no attempt to satisfy 
either of the requirements of this aiterion. 
Criterion i; Completeness 
Group 2 methods elicit a good deal more information than group 1 methods do; CG and 
UHF are particularly wide-ranging and thorough in the case data they explicitly take into 
account. and S and L VC cover tbe same or more ground in a less e1plicit way. The group 1 
methods do not process detailed information about any factor, and they completely e1clude 
whole categories of potentially relevant information: DEJ. B. KL and FDA do not inquire about 
previous experience of the patient with Dor similar drugs or events of type E. and n. FDA 
and~ cannot take into account details of E such as laboratory findings or serum levels in 
assessing the probability of D-causation. 
None of the methods eicept LVC attempts to elicit information about the prior incidence of 
events of type E with and without D involvement, e1cept in the crudest. most qualitative way. 
FDA ignores information about previous D-E connections entirely. while N·s questions 1 and 5 
-- .. are there previous conclusive reports on this reaction?" and .. are there alternative causes 
(other than the drug) that could on their own have caused the reaction?" -- are typical of the 
other Group J method·s treatment of prior incidence. The Group 2 methods refine N·s 
approach, for e1a mpJe by considering what the alternative causes might be (and hence how 
many different etiologicaJ contenders there are). Nonetheless, the questions dealing with the 
incidence of events of type E from the various possible causes still caJl for broad categorical 
answers; for eiample. CG asks if "adverse event of rare spontaneous occurrence?", and Stakes 
account of how Jong D has been on the market relative to the number of reported D-E 
connections to deter mine to which of 12 "incidence .. classes the adverse reaction belongs. 
The failure of the methods to take into account more refined prior incidence estimates is 
related to their general position on quantification. None e1cept L VC process information in 
quantitative form. and none e1cept LVC deliver their output degrees of belief as numbers. 
Unfortunately, although LVC deals with numbers, it does not use mathematics to process 
them and does not define their meanings, but uses the interval from O to 1 purely as an 
analogue scale. Thus. <:orollary 2 of the completeness aiterion is uniformly violated by the 
methods under review. 
Criterion 5: Etiological baJancini 
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With respect to this criterion. there is no dilTerence between Group 1 and Group 2 
methods: they all use the D-causaJ hypothesis approach lo processing case information and 
thus violate the criterion. Tbe role that alternative etiologies play in their assessments varies 
somewhat. however. On one eitreme is FS, who ask if ·the possibility that clinical state or 
therapies may e1plain the event can be ruled out?"'. and if the answer is .. no''. it is impossible 
to attain an assessment more favorable to D-causation than "doubtful". In contrast, FDA only 
takes account of alternative etiologies if there is a positive response to dechallenge and no 
rechallenge. in wruch case if the event ··could be due to an e1isting clinical condition ... the 
rating is "possible"'. otherwise ··probable". Neither these methods nor N. [L. DEJ. S or CG takes 
any account of how likely the data is given nondrug causation for data about timing. 
characteristics of the event. or rechaUenge; S and CG do consider whether a specific treatment 
for B was ad ministered when evaluating dechallenge data, but they do not consjder how 
likely it is for E to abate Hit is not treated and is not an adverse reactjon to D. UHF consider 
this last possibility in their dechallenge uis. which elicits and analyzes data as consistenUy 
with etiological balancing as any method eicept LVC; but the alternative candjdates, timing 
and rechaIJenge ues of KLHF considers only tbe e1istence of other etiologies, not the relative 
li.keliho~.id or the data given these compared to D-causation. 
B has three criteria, and the ratings with respect to lhe first two, time sequence and 
response pattern, are strictly of the D-causaJ hypothesis type. The third criteria is '"role d 
underlying disease(s)"", and the user is asked to decide whether .. the manifest.aUons observed 
could not be due to the underlying disease," or "'tbey might be due to the disease. but the 
evolution was in favor of adverse reaction," or "they could be due to the underlying disease 
aod. moreover, the evolution was against the possibility of an adverse reaction."' This choice 
cJearly requires eUoJogical balancing, but at a global level. so that the user essentially is 
required to carry out a complete causality assessment in his head to decide among the three 
a.!ternalives; t.o carry out this assessment, he must surely integrate timing and response 
pattern information. so it is not dear what additional role the first two criteria play. 
In contrast to Lhe other methods. L VC eiplicit1y adopts the etiological balancing strategy. 
Tbe point of each of the assessments required in this method is to balance the likelihood of 
specific information given D-causation against its likelihood given alternative etioJo6ies. A 
score of O or l corresponds to certainty. with respect to alternative and D-causation 
respectively, and a score of 0.5 corresponds to n~utrality (or equally favoring evidence) wjth 
respect to the two hypotheses. 
Criterion 6: No a priori constraints on factor effects 
All the methods, eicept L VC, place constraints on factor effects. In general. these 
constraints are severe and quite idiosyncratic, and they lead to unreasonable assessments 
when the methods are applied to cases with features similar to those sketched in the 
discussion of this criterion in Section 3 and AppendiI I. S and CG allow the most fleiibility in 
the e1tent to which informatjon about different factors can affect the final assessment, but it 
is difficult to judge CG in this respect because its complete sroring system has not been 
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published. L VC gives no procedures for combining the scores on JU n.ine factors, so Its 
performance with respect to this aiterioo cannot be evaluated. 
Here are some examples of the kinds of constraints inherent in the methods. ES gives a 
maximum rating of "'doubtlul" unless ·-ihe possibility that clirucal state or therapies may 
eiplain the event can be ruJed out ... and unless an adverse reaction is known. the highest 
rating is .. possible .. if rechallenge has not been attempted. If the timing relation between D 
and E was not .. appropriate ... then D and E are judged .. unrelated .. ; otherwise. infcrmati011 
about timing plays no role at all in the assessment (even if Eis an allergic reaction occurring 
immediately after ad ministration of D at tbe site of ad ministraUonl). Also, a positive 
response to dechallenge .mm1 produce an assessment of ··at most defirute .. (compare to 
example 2 in Section 3). while a negative response to rechallenge cannot reduce the chance of 
D-ca usa tion. 
These examples from ES are not at all atypical; a similar list could be developed for any of 
the other methods, except possibly S and CG and, of course, L VC. Constraints can be positive 
or negative: in the eiamples above, the constraint on timing is negative, while the constraint 
on positive response to dechallenge is positive (jt is forced to bear more weight than it may 
rightfully carry in special circumstances). Some of the methods mainly impose negative 
constraints; trus is true. for example. for N and UHF. which have additive scoring systems 
with a muimum of 2 points per fact.or (generally just one). with 10 and sil factors 
respectively. Thus. UHF cannot produce a "definite" assessment. regardless of the strength 
of the evid~nce about timing and prior frequencies. unless a positive response to dechaHenge 
is observed. 
S and CG do better with respect to this criterion. because they allow strong evidence in 
various factors to produce very high scores for that fact.or. and S in particular avoids negative 
constraints (see for e1ample factor 4, rechallenge, where both .. difficult to judge due to 
changes in underlying disease -- no response" and "'difficult to judge due to changes in 
underlying disease -- some response", a weak negative and weak positive response 
respectively, score a neutral 5 and 6 respectively). But they are not completely free of 
constraints either: the scores CG assigns to dechallenge and rechallenge depend just on 
wheL'ler the response was positive or negatjye, and not on special circumstances (assuming 
the event is reversible and is not treated directly); in particular. in the "dose-dependent" 
scoring category, negative response to rechallenge is always taken as strong evidence against 
D-causation (-25) and positive response strong evidence for D-causation (+30), in contrast to 
example 8 above. 
Conclusions 
None of the methods performs satisfactorily when measured against our criteria. More 
specifical.ly, here is a summary of the most important results from our evaluation: 
1) OnJy one or the methods (L VC) employs the strategy of etioJogjcaJ balancing to analyze 
case information. All the rest use the D-causaJ hypothesis strategy, with at most minor 
adjustments. 
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2) None or Lhe methods tries to provide an explicit rationale ror the way it oonverts a 
state of inf or matjon into a degree of belief. In particular. the methods combine the scores 
assigned to the various r actors in essentially arbitrary ways. typically with strong .l priori 
constraints imposed on the effect that information about each factor can have on the 
overall assessment. 
3} No method has satisfactory procedures for incorporating quantitative information or 
measuring the user·s uncertainty about the information elicited from rum. 
4) The methods that elicit the most oomplete states of information tend to present the 
greatest difficulty in tracing the effects that particujar pieces of input have on the output. 
On the other band, the methods for which it is easiest to trace these effects either fail to 
ask about important sources of information or call for substantial implicit integrative 
judgements on the part of their users. 
In conc!usion. if the criteria are reasonable. the methods are not. Are there alternatives? 
Certainly one exists: gJoba.l introspection 121 I. the unaided judgement of experts. But it can 
be judged according to these aiteria as well, and its eiplicitness and explanatory capability 
are clearly poor, while it seems unJikeJy that it satisfies the aiteria of completeness and no I 
priori c:r.Jtlstraints. In our opinion, a new approach to causality assessment is required. In 
collaboration v..1itb Judith Jones, Oaudio Naranjo and Michael Kramer. we plan to present such 
an approach in a future article and show that it conforms to the cdteria developed here. 
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TABLE 1: THE METHODS 
Method Authors References . Group. 
B Blanc et al. 13) l 
CG Venulet et al. (29 ), (30), (31 J 2 
DHJ Dan.gou ma u et al. 14), (2) 1 
BS Emanueli and Saccheti (6), (7) 1 
FDA Jones et al. (11), (28) 1 
n Karch and Lasagna (14) l 
UHF rramer et al ( 18), (9 ), (22) 2 
LVC Lagier et al. (19), (20) 3 
N Naranjo et al [25) 1 
s Stephens (27) 2 
Note: Group 1 methods are the shortest, with fewer than ten questions; Group 2 and 3 
methods are more complicated. 
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APPENDIX J: ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES RELATED TO CRITERION 6 
Timing 
EiampJe 1: A patient with clinically stable Ju pus erythematosus deveJops renal 
dysfunction (an inaease in serum creatinine from J to 2 mas) one day after starting aspirin 
therapy. The renal dysfunction could conceivably be due to the underlying disease, but if so 
it would have approximately the same chance of appearing at any stage ot this life-Jong 
disease. Hence. in this case the concordance of the timing with the hypothesis of aspirin-
causaUon, compared to tbe diffuseness or the timing distrjbutJon for the alternative etiology, 
gives fairly conclusive evidence for drug causation, and so methods should not bound the 
potential effect of timing information from above. 
El ample 2: As above. e1cept that the serum aeat.inine increases one hour after the first 
aspirin tablet is taken. In this case. the latency perjod is too short (even with renal shut-
down it would take at least 12 hours for the serum creatinine to rise by l mgs). and so 
information about timing conclusively refutes drug causation, showing that the effect of 
timing information on probability of D-causation sbouJd not be bounded from below. even 
when the patient received D before E occurred. 
QioicaJ characteristics 
Example 3: A child in 111 intensive care unit uneipectedJy develops cardiac arrest and 
dies while recejving digoxin therapy. Blood tests show.the di301m level is twenty times the 
tberapeutjc Jevel;the assay is repeated, with the same result. Trus information makes it much 
more likely that digoiin was the cause of death. Thus, the effects of information about serum 
levels (or other clinica.J characteristics associated with the event E) should not be bounded 
from above. 
DechaUenge 
Eiample 4: The e1amp1es presented in section 3 showed the effect of positive response to 
dechallenge could vary considerably depending on circumstances. Similiarly, negative 
response to dechaJJenge can provide conclusive evidence against drug causation or it can be 
neutral between drug and non drug etiologies. This eiample illustrates the for mer possibility, 
the ne1t the latter. A patient develops symptoms of dizziness associated with postural 
bypotension after beginning aJpha-methyJdopa therapy for hypertension. These symptoms 
persist for at least one year after the medication is stopped. Clearly. methyldopa causation is 
highly unlikely. 
Example .5: A patient taking an estrogen-containing rontraceptive suffers a stroke. She is 
taken off the pill, with no effect on recovery of function from the stroke. In this case, the 
negative response to dechaUenge does not argue against estrogen caus2tion for the stroke. 
RechaHenge 
El ample 6: Positive response to rechaUenge often provides conclusive evidence or drua 
causation. The following example shows that it need not do so. A re male adolescent who has 
recently become seiually active develops non-specific vaginitis shortly after starting lo take 
oral contraceptives. By the time she sees a physician for her vaginal discharge she has 
broken off her relationship with her previous boyfriend. The physician treats her vagirulis 
and discontinues the oral contraceptive. A year later, she deveJops a new relationshlp. 
restarts the contraceptive and again develops non-specific vaginitis. In this case, it is 
impossible to distinguish the possible causal roles of se1ual activity and the oral 
contraceptive, since their effects are mutually confounded. Tbe recurrence with rechalJenge 
does not increase the probability of drug causality, since the seiual activity "recurred" 
simultaneoJJsly. 
Background incidence 
Example 7: In some cases. the most important information differentiating between the 
various etiological candidates is simply background incidence, not data concerning the 
particular case at hand. For example, suppose a patient who has been undergoing dialysis for 
some time with no previous adverse effects receives both diphenhydramine and iron deitran 
in dialysis for the first time and suffers acute anaphyluis. Both drugs are possible causes, 
but iron de1tran is associated much more frequently with alJergic reactions than is 
dipbenhydramine, and so the anaphyJaxis is much more likely to be caused by the iron 
deitran than the diphenhydramine. Thus, no method should bound a priori the effect of 
background incidence on the probability of drug causation. 
EiampJe 8: In contrast to example 9, here is a case in which background incidence 
strongly favors nondrug causation. A patient in septic shock, severe pulmonary edema and 
renal shutdown is given bemodia1ysis to remove fluid as a final effort to save his life. The 
patient becomes increasingly hypoxic and hypotensive and dies within an hour of beginning 
dialysis. Although hemodialysis can produce these effects. they were sufficiently likely as 
the natural course of the patient ·s disease that the probability that the reactions were due to 
the hemodialysis is very small. 
